Abstract. For centuries, philosophy and psychology in one way or another identified thought with logic, or logic with thought. Only in recent decades has it become clear that there is more to thought than logic. Evolutionary psychology has stressed the adaptive function of thought, as of other processes often identified as psychological. Gigerenzer et al. have worked for some years now on a program of research in which thinking is approached as an adaptive process. According to them, it is misleading to use the complexities of logic, mathematics or statistics as the standards for correct thinking or as a model for thought. On the contrary, thinking is the effective use of simple heuristics. The four volumes discussed in this review essay demonstrate that the approach can be very fruitful in many domains of human reasoning, and can be effective in practical problem solving as well, without having to fall back on the intricacies of logic, statistics, mathematics and other tools of the trade of scientific decision making.
It is interesting to see in the history of science and philosophy how we dreamt rationality. Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Baruch de Spinoza, David Hume and Immanuel Kant freed thinking from religious belief, or so they thought. At least they made us think that thought is the gift whereby humans are especially equipped to understand nature. Interestingly, it was seen as a special, human and individual competence. Potentially, every individual person could know nature if he or she used reason, experiment and observation, and, admittedly, I also once was convinced that this was the case.
The next step was to equate thinking and logic. Logic, said Gottlob Frege, for example, is the language of thinking. Psychology and philosophy were united. Even the tradition that started with Alan Turing and modeled thought after mechanical logic, that is, computer programs, essentially saw human reasoning as a branch of logical thinking ideally following the lines leading from premise to conclusion. Every non-argumentative element was an aberration or weakness, all too human and to the detriment of Rationality, as if we were imperfectly designed or designed for too many purposes. In a sense, for instance, Karl Popper's objective knowledge (World-3 versus World-2, which originates in Karl Bühlers objektiver Geist versus Erlebnisaspekt) and Noam Chomsky's 'competence-performance' distinction come out of the insight that the psychological act of thinking could be quite different from the logical standard of thinking.
The focus of these philosophers or psychologists, and indeed their objective sympathy, as it were, was with the logical. The psychological side of rationality was associated with a self-imposed hindrance ('selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit', Kant) that can be overcome by following the rules of the rational standard in order to come to proper conclusions. You could do it if you want to! In two senses, this was still the Cartesian approach: thinking as a special gift of following objective standards of reasoning, and reasoning (science, philosophy, logic, rationality and its outcomes) as an individual activity.
Some psychologists questioned this approach: Karl Bühler, Oswald Külpe, Wilhelm Wundt, Frederic Bartlett, the Gestalt Psychologists, George Humphrey and, more recently, Herbert Simon, Peter Wason, Philip JohnsonLaird and others recognized the boundaries of human rationality. More importantly, in response to the nightmare of irrationality, that is, our failure to comply with the standards of logic, they developed the empirical approach to exploring human thinking. With the exception of Bartlett, however, their approach was individualistic and focused on what individuals do (or what their mind/brain does) when they think, in contrast to what they should do. Thinking was still defined from the perspective of logic, but what about handicaps in thinking, and why are they there?
Gerd Gigerenzer and his partners in the line of research I discuss in this essay could be seen as continuing this approach. Presenting their approach like that would be inaccurate, however, as it is completely different. Indeed, they do try to account for the same facts that the rationalists call biases in thinking, but they also try to account for other facts of human action (including mental acts) and experience. Moreover, acts that rationalists and bounded rationalists consider to be biased are seen in a different light from the perspective of the naturalist approach. First, the biological, that is, evolutionary, aspects of mentality are fully incorporated. Second, as a consequence, there is a focus on the social aspects. If the human species belongs to the primates, and if primates are social species, then at least part of our mental competences must have a survival function because of their use in social life, as well as in determining our position in the ecological niche in which we live. Perception and cognition are not there (as in Hume as well as Descartes) for knowing the world in the philosophical sense or for finding food and shelter in the practical (i.e. praxis) sense; perception and cognition are there for action, and action is there to be social beings.
The Gigerenzer et al. books reviewed here recognize, if not lead, the discussion about these developments in a number of ways. For instance, an essay in Adaptive Thinking focuses on the social origin of the computer metaphor, which contrasts heavily with the alleged mental, or even cerebral, origin of the computer. Before Babbage's analytical engine, the machinery for calculation consisted of human 'computers' (literally), who did their calculating work routinely in hierarchically organized systems based on the division of labor. Already in this historical observation, Gigerenzer shows his social approach to artificial intelligence and cognition. The standard approach, on the other hand, still is that the artificial computer resembles the individual brain/mind (the biological computer).
Mind as Machiavellian: Social Rationality and Social Intelligence
More to the point of the focus of Gigerenzer's work, however, are the many chapters in which he elaborates on work that started with Cosmides' criticisms of (1986 Cosmides' criticisms of ( , 1989 Cosmides & Tooby, 1994a , 1994b , and alternative explanations for, the mistakes humans make in reasoning when confronted with, for example, falsification problems, as in the so-called 'Wason selection task' 1 (Wason, 1966) . Wason, as well as, for instance, JohnsonLaird (1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1995; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972 ), Cheng and co-workers (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986) and Over and Mankeltov (1993) , sought explanations for cognitive mistakes within more traditional reasoning schemes. Cosmides was the first to introduce evolutionary explanations, thereby pointing at the social origins of allegedly domain-specific, bounded reasoning competences of human beings. He pointed out that human beings were most successful at solving reasoning problems that were useful in discovering cheaters. Human beings are primates and therefore social beings; deception of others is one of the strategies that primates use to survive in the group. Social structures, especially social exchange relationships, are vulnerable to cheating and to profiting from other persons' benefits; maximizing benefits with minimizing costs is highly developed in primates like us. According to Cosmides, then, if reasoning is good for something, it must involve detecting cheaters.
Gigerenzer amends this hypothesis and cleverly goes one step further. Our human domain-specific reasoning is not so much focused on detecting cheaters (as still would have been consistent with Kant's moral that to cheat is immoral, whether it is me or another person who is being cheated) as it is aimed at detecting being cheated (Machiavellian cunning). Chapter 10, entitled 'Domain-Specific Reasoning: Social Contracts and Cheating Detection', from the section on 'Social Rationality' in Adaptive Thinking, deals with this as a social issue. Mind you, it is not, as Gigerenzer explicitly demonstrates, that the social contract version of presenting a logical problem merely facilitates its solution. Instead, people use no propositional logic at all, except when forced to take an exam in propositional logic. Nor is it a matter of the social construction of logic as an instrument of social rule, power and the exclusion of certain individuals. Even the ruling classes do not use it in decision making, just as the philosophizing classes, or even the logicians, fail to use propositional logic outside their classrooms. Social intelligence is a faculty, not a general factor (ch. 11) and works with fast and frugal heuristics (ch. 1 of Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart). In other words, social intelligence is remarkably smart with relatively few rules, such as 'Take The Best' (ch. 4 of Simple Heuristics; about the cue(s) to use in categorizing), 'Take The Last' (ibid.) or even 'Take the one you recognize'. Research has demonstrated that these rules are very successful, beating quite a few sophisticated calculations the rationalists have come up with in the last few centuries.
Mind as the Biological Decision Maker
According to Gigerenzer, reasoning inevitably is primarily social reasoning. If we are reasoning beings, we are Machiavellians, not Cartesians, Leibnizians or Pascalians. Another way of seeing ourselves is as decision makers, that is, ignorant decision makers. Theoreticians of decision making have a favorite quotation: 'in this world there is nothing certain but death and taxes' (quoted in Reckoning with Risk, p. 3, attributed to Benjamin Franklin). If life (former species included) teaches us one thing, however, it is that our ignorance has not prevented us from making smart decisions. Even in rational environments such as intensive-care hospital rooms and the philo-THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14 (2) 264 sophy departments of universities, 'quick and dirty' decisions have to be made. Deliberations following the rules of unbounded rationality or optimization are lethal if your patient has his second heart attack, or when your department is under threat of being closed down. Gigerenzer shows that we are actually good at decision making and have nothing to be ashamed of.
Surprisingly, western science and philosophy have developed rationally well-wrought procedures and arguments for making decisions that, in the end, prove to be weaker than the heuristics of those who have never learned or understood the procedures and arguments. Even Bruce, the head of the philosophy department, who has learned the rules and even teaches the importance of maximizing expected utility, does not always understand the rules enough to explain them to lay persons. Ignorance makes us smart. Unbounded rationality procedures and rules for optimization under constraints may provide the human species with the rational procedures that can lead us in the right direction if we have the time, the calculation capacity and the data to decide rationally, and/or if we have a computer to calculate them automatically. Unfortunately, most of the time things are worse from Bruce's perspective. Our rationality is bounded by lack of time, improper knowledge and insufficient computational competence, or the unavailability of a computer. We simply do not have the time and the means to calculate expected utilities or Bayesian rules. Herbert Simon and many of his coworkers and followers have already suggested satisfying strategies for finding optimal solutions among a list of alternatives. Gigerenzer favors even simpler means, referred to as fast and frugal heuristics. They 'use little information and computation to make a variety of decisions' (Simple Heuristics, p. 7) and 'employ a minimum of time, knowledge, and computation to make adaptive choices in real environments. . . . We consider [them] to represent bounded rationality in its purest form' (ibid., p. 14). Gigerenzer's is a research program that explores and explains reasoning and decision making in real life and also develops and advocates a framework for developing heuristics for artificial agents involved in quick and dirty decision making.
The program of studying boundedly rational heuristics involves (a) designing computational models of candidate simple heuristics, (b) analyzing the environmental structures in which they perform well, (c) testing their performance in real-world environments, and (d) determining whether and when people really use these heuristics. (ibid., p. 16) Heuristics that guide the search for options and arguments, stop the search for options and arguments, and decide among found alternatives can be remarkably effective in light of their remarkable simplicity. For instance, suppose you are an Australian and are asked to decide which town is larger, Amsterdam or Scheveningen. If you were Bruce (the head of the philosophy department), you would take some time, go to a computer, browse the Internet and finally find out that these are Dutch towns, and Amsterdam is the larger one. However, Bill, who does not know much about computers and is on his way to the rugby field, immediately says 'Amsterdam'. He knows Amsterdam by name and does not recognize the name Scheveningen or even know how to pronounce it. He nevertheless feels quite certain, and, of course, he is right. In situations like this, recognition can be an effective heuristic. Even on the stock market, recognizing a fund may be a good indication of its value for your profitable stock portfolio. Correction: it is the best indication. In chapter 3 of Simple Heuristics, Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann and Gigerenzer show that the recognition-based heuristic beats funds managed by experts, random stock picks and stock portfolio assembling by experts who know the international stock market. Using the recognition heuristic, German lay people are better than German experts who know the internationally best funds, including the alleged national best (but small, unknown) funds. The latter lost money, the first enjoyed great returns. For Americans, the same was true, mutatis mutandis. (Note, however, that these results were obtained in the years of fast-rising indices.) Even driving a Porsche can be heuristically valuable in these circles: if this stock expert drives a Porsche, he must be a successful investor. People use these heuristics implicitly, and, yes, they generally make good decisions when there is little or no time to make a choice, they have little or no knowledge, and little or no intelligence (artificial or otherwise) is available.
If this surprises you, you must be Bruce, the head of the philosophy department. Human beings have survived for a longer period of time with no philosophy department at hand than with one, and in environments where the philosophy department was too far away to travel to, and regardless of the types of experts to be found there. The mind is the tool we use for decision making and reasoning, especially in social situations. It is definitely a biological tool, not a logical reasoning device.
Mind as the Estimation and Categorization Organ
More of the same goes for many related subjects. For instance, Categorizing by Elimination is suggested by Berretty, Todd and Martignon (Simple Heuristics, ch. 11) as the fast and frugal heuristic in categorization. It involves categorizing objects by eliminating the categories and uses the smallest amount of information possible for finding the category to which certain objects belong. A bird that has to be recognized is categorized in seconds. Using only size, shape of silhouette and form of motion, you may already categorize it as a buzzard. That is what you want to know, and that is what you can expect in the countryside you are in. Rabbits will be faster. They only have to know if it is a predator bird. Bruce, the Bayesian head of the philosophy department, would look up the formulae of probabilities that THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(2) 266 this flying object is a buzzard, hawk or pigeon, and so on, given the base rates for the present geographic position, and so on. After summing up the dimensions of classifications and designing a decision tree (the rabbit is severely wounded by now), the work begins and the outcome is that this is a buzzard, more precisely the rough-legged buzzard (Buteo lagopus). The rabbit is dead.
According to Berretty et al.'s theory, in reality we use elimination models. One model was developed from Tversky (1972) . In Elimination by Aspects (EBA), Tversky suggests that the aspects (cues) on which we decide are probabilistically ordered, and selected for, based on their utility for making the actual decision. If there are other possibilities that are irrelevant in light of the aspect considered, these options are removed from the set of possible choices. In the Categorization By Elimination (CBE) model developed from this, you are supposed to eliminate categories by deselecting the possible categories based on the non-presence of certain cues. Say you want to identify the bird over there: you order the features according to their weight, choose the aspect with (next) highest weight, and decide whether this aspect is perceived in the particular bird. If not, then all possible bird names with that aspect (say all birds with V-shaped wings) are eliminated from the subset to choose from. In the end, you are left with the one name you are looking for. It is perfectly possible that you use only three or four cues in the process. Berretty et al.'s version is based on the CBE model, but focuses on non-probabilistic categorization. Their model suggests that-depending on the nature of the problem that requires categorization-a few relevant cue dimensions are selected, and then the dimensions are divided up into 'bins' covering a continuous range of cue values, numeric or nominal. Each bin corresponds to a certain category. For birds, for instance, wingspan may have six 'bins', for example 65-75 cm (the red-foot falcon bin), 65-80 cm (the kestrel bin), 70-85 cm (the hobby, i.e. falco subbuteo, bin) and 90-100 cm (the barabary falcon bin). This example (Simple Heuristics, shows that the 'bins' may overlap or leave out certain ranges, may be numeric or nominal, and are indicated already by the name of one of the possible category members. Cues may be ordered, and the order in which they are processed is not critical. This frugal model compared remarkably well to other more sophisticated models, including neural networks, in terms of fitting and generalization using data sets such as irises, wines and mushrooms.
Mind as Risk Calculator: Ecological Rationality
Just as humankind has learned, and inherited, from earlier species the ability to recognize cues which indicate lethal varieties of mushrooms that look like food, we must have acquired good heuristics for calculating opportunities VAN HEZEWIJK: WAKING UP FROM THE DREAM OF REASON and especially risks. Gigerenzer categorizes risk calculation as a matter of ecological rationality. In Reckoning with Risk, 2 the focus is on the way we deal with the representation of uncertainties. Of course, most of our lives are lived in uncertainty. However, either we are good at fooling ourselves into thinking that almost every next step is certain, or we deal with the uncertainties fast and frugally. Reckoning with Risk is aimed at the general public, and Gigerenzer's policy seems to be to make the general public less 'innumeral' by not teaching more statistics or contributing more formulae and instead presenting chances and risks in the formats with which we naturally deal with them. The book discusses several examples of risks and risky risk strategies in modern life: breast cancer screening, informed consent, AIDS testing counseling, wife battering, expert testimony in trials, DNA fingerprinting, and the chance of becoming a victim of violence. This list includes both some of the modern sources of fear and some of the modern illusions of certainty about evidence. For example, DNA 'fingerprints' involve much more uncertainty than most people believe (based on popular movies and television programs); AIDS testing has a much higher rate of false positives and misses than is acceptable in the context of the risks associated with dying and being stigmatized. In the case of preventive breast cancer screening, Gigerenzer demonstrates that most members of the medical profession, including physicians, are incompetent in both calculating the costs and benefits and presenting them in a way that the women concerned can understand and decide on properly. (This does not imply that the patients' intelligence is too low to understand, but that the physicians seldom have done their best to find out what is the natural way to present risks and probabilities-if they know them at all.) Gigerenzer concludes that only from age 50 onwards is there some benefit associated with mammography screening: the reduction is 4 in 1000 women (annual or biennial screening makes no significant difference). At earlier ages, the damage done is much higher than the profits in terms of early detection (including false positives with subsequent invasive surgery, false negatives, radiationinduced breast cancer and non-progressive breast cancer) and mortality rates, let alone the financial costs and the risk of physicians being sued (which leads to more false positives). On average, lay people estimate that across all ages 60 in 1000 lives are saved. The actual gain across all ages (in a period of 10 years) is one life in one thousand. Women-concludes Gigerenzer-deserve to get the information in an accessible format. However, it seems that most physicians present the figures as proportions or conditional probabilities that even they do not really understand. As shown in this interesting book, as well as in the others reviewed here, there are alternative ways to present chances and risks in an understandable way. These include 'natural frequencies', which are reported to enhance the understanding of risks. Minds-even physicians' minds-are adapted to natural frequencies not to probabilities.
Risks typically are presented as probabilities (which actually leave out the base rate, N), like this:
The probability that one of these women has breast cancer is 0.8 percent. If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 90 percent that she will have a positive mammogram. If a woman does not have breast cancer, the probability is 7 percent that she will still have a positive mammogram. What is the probability that she actually has breast cancer? (Reckoning with Risk, p. 41) Presenting risks as natural frequencies involves using terms like the following:
Eight out of every 1000 women have breast cancer. Of these 8 women with breast cancer, 7 will have a positive mammogram. Of the remaining 992 women who don't have breast cancer, some 70 will still have a positive mammogram. Imagine a sample of women who have positive mammograms in screening. How many of these women actually have breast cancer? (Reckoning with Risk, p. 42) Of 48 physicians presented with a problem concerning the estimated chance of breast cancer given a positive screening mammogram, 24 received the information in terms of conditional probabilities, and the other half in natural frequencies. In the first condition, four of the 24 estimates were correct, and 16 exceeded the correct answer. In the 'natural condition', 14 out of 24 physicians were correct, and only five were 'hopeless': they estimated the chance at 70 or 80 percent.
Mind as a Statistician: Reasoning and Cognitive Illusions
One other important theme repeatedly raised in these books is Gigerenzer's debate with the 'heuristics and biases' program of Kahneman, Tversky and others. These authors study systematic 'errors' persons make in their statistical reasoning, explaining the errors as biases, and thereby suggesting they entertain cognitive-especially probability-illusions. Gigerenzer et al. do mainly two things. First, they show that most of the errors are not errors at all but are the result of the authors' interpretation of probability-that is, the frequency interpretation (or frequentist interpretation) in which a probability is a proportion of a sufficiently large number, representing the percentage of the total that eventually will represent the proportion for which a certain characteristic is valid. The frequency interpretation interprets probabilities as mathematical probabilities, looks at base rates without considering context or reference classes, and is only possible when there are sufficiently many cases already known. Single events are meaningless for frequentists, and this, I'd like to suggest, pertains to positivism's commitment to a lack of realism (Van Hezewijk, 1988 , 1995 approach, the propensity interpretation, in which every single event has a probability of occurring. It may not always be easy to establish this propensity, but it is not fundamentally impossible (Popper, 1972 (Popper, , 1983 Gigerenzer suggests that there is an alternative (also realist) interpretation in which probability as frequency of occurrence is distinguished from probability as confidence of judgment. Gigerenzer's hypothesis is that most people intuitively distinguish frequency of occurrence from confidence of judgment, whereas in the frequentist interpretation these different meanings are no longer distinguished. If so, most cognitive illusions will disappear because ordinary people understand probability as confidence, that is, as the degree of belief that is not based on frequencies but on the contextual possibility that such an event could occur in that kind of situation. As Gigerenzer et al. report in chapter 14 of Simple Heuristics, most cognitive illusions disappear once the problem is presented to participants in terms that explicitly give room for the more natural interpretation and distinction. The base rate fallacy, for example, disappears once participants are allowed to use their intuition that not all probabilities are mathematical probabilities, use natural frequencies rather than conditional probabilities, and use information about context and reference class. Their intuitive Bayesian reasoning no longer shows the alleged errors, and cognitive illusions vanish.
Mind as an Adaptive Toolbox: Bounded Rationality
Uniting the approaches of Gigerenzer and other authors in these books, some of which were briefly mentioned above, is the metaphysical (Van Hezewijk, 1988 , 1999 but nevertheless necessary, realistic and valuable program (or set of heuristics) that the human mind is an adaptive toolbox, evolved as humans encountered diverse but sufficiently similar problematic situations to allow for the development of stable strategies for response, as if these strategies were behavioral, cognitive, emotional and motivational organs made possible by the brain. It is 'adaptive' because it can adapt to many new situations, and is a 'toolbox' because there are many domain-specific tools with flexible use. Nevertheless, tool usage has restrictions. We may be rational in the courses taught by the philosophy department, but rationality is bounded in daily life-even within the walls of the philosophy department.
In a sense, all of the books discussed here have the same heuristic, even though the approaches and what is approached differ. Most central are the collections of essays (Adaptive Thinking and Simple Heuristics). Here, we find Gigerenzer's own version of the core aspects of the program and some enhancements and diversions of the main ideas circling around this core, for instance about memory, estimation and categorization. Less discussed in my review is the edited report of the 84th Dahlem Conference of 1999 (Bounded Rationality). Nevertheless, it is interesting because here the circle around the THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14 (2) 270 core is drawn still wider. The conference participants included experimental, organizational and general economists; logistics, artificial intelligence engineers and industrial engineers; neuro-, animal and behavioral biologists; psychologists; and an anthropologist. In multidisciplinary groups, they discussed issues ranging from evidence for the existence of the adaptive toolbox, optimization (i.e. the fiction of it), choice preferences, emotions and cost-benefit assessment, reinforcement learning models and reciprocation in prisoner dilemma games, decision making in super organisms, effects of emotions and social processes, goodwill and exchange processes, and the role of culture in bounded rationality. Some debates have been highly interesting but cannot be discussed here.
The most recent publication, Reckoning with Risk, is-as I mentioned before-aimed at the general public. What all of the books have in common is a highly readable style, relevant problems, significant contributions for the target group, and the idea that somehow, somewhere in the center of 'mount improbable', and at some time, the tunnels which biology, psychology and other disciplines have started to dig will meet in an evolutionary approach.
Notes

'If there is a "D" on one side of the card, then there is a "3" on the other side.'
Test this rule by turning one or more of the following cards. (Cards are D, E, 3 and 4, and have a letter on one, and a number on the other side.) Because a conditional 'P then Q' can only be violated when 'P & not-Q', the P and the not-Q, that is, the 'D' and '4' cards, must be turned over. Admit this takes you some time. As it will the next time. And the next time. 2. I quote from the Allen Lane paperback version, entitled Reckoning with Risk:
Learning to Live with Uncertainty, which I think better represents the content of the volume than Calculated Risks, the Simon & Schuster version published in the US, also in 2002.
